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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PROVO TRANSFER & STORAGE

co.,

Petitioner,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING,
~d
STEWART M. HANSON, its
Commissioners,
Defendarn.ts.

No. 8168

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Public Service Commission of Utah, herein
refered to as the ''Commission'' issued its ''Order
to Appear and Show Cause" directed to Provo Transfer & Storage Co. requiring it to show cause why the operating authority heretofore issued to it should not be
revoked, suspended, or such other penalties imposed as
are provided by law. (R. 1)
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At that time Provo Transfer held Certificate No.
1049 issued to it by the Commission authorizing it to
operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle of commodities generally within Provo City and a 15 mile
radius thereof. This Certificate No. 1049 was issued
June 22, 1953 ( R. 28 - 31), signed by all three Commissioners and proper tariffs and insurance had been
filed with the Commission and operations continuously
conducted.
On Feb. 1, 1954 the Commission issued its Report
and Order (R. 8 - 21) in Case No. 3945 after hearing
evidence on the investigation, and made rather extended
findings wherein the history of the carrier was reviewed
and certain "Irregularities and violations of the law''
c'Oncluded. These latter were primarily based upon a
premise since determined by your Court to be false,
namely that Wallace A. Peterson, djbja Wally's Motor
Line had no authority to serve between Salt Lake City
and Provo, and that hence it could not interchange
traffic at Provo. Then the Commission ordered that
the Certificate of Provo Transfer be ''cancelled and
annulled'' effective February 1, 1954, the date of the
Order.
A petition for Rehearing was duly filed (R. 23)
and denied March 1, 1954 (R. 25). From this denial
the present appeal to your court is taken. More detailed reference to particular facts will be stated in
the argument.
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION,
TOGETHER WI TH ITS ORDER DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REHEARING ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, AND ARE
IN EXCESS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLI·C SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH.
1

POINT TWO
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING AND VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AND THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE RELATING TO SAID MATTERS.

POINT THREE
TH.NT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS PREDICATED UPON
FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONTRARY TO THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH IN THE CA;sE OF WALLACE A. PETERSON, d/b/a
WALLY'S MOTOR LINE, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, ET AL. 266 Pac. (2d) 497.

POINT FOUR
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER DENY TO CARRIERS
AND THE PUBLIC THE RIGHT OF INTERCHANGE OF
FREIGHT AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE'S AND CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

POINT FIVE
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

POINT SIX
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION,
TOGETHER WITH ITS ORDER DENYING THE PETITION
FOR REHEARING ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, AND ARE
IN EXCESS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLI·C SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH.

POINT TWO
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING AND VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AND THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE RELATING TO SAID MATTERS.

This proceeding was initiated by an Order to Appear and Show Cause which required production of
all hooks and records and to show cause why its operating authority should not be revoked, suspended or
other penalties imposed should it appear that Provo
Transfer "is not operating in accordance with its operating authority and the laws of the State of Utah and
the rules of the Com1nission". No specification of charges
is made but a grand "fishing expedition" was initiated by the Conunission.
We recognize the powers and duties of the Comlnission under Section 54-G--1-, U.C.A. 1953 to "supervise and regulate all common motor carriers" and
Section 54-6-20 granting it the power "for good cause,
and after notice and hearing (to) suspend, alter, amend
or revoke any certificate, permit or license issued by
it hereunder.'' However, we do not acknowledge that
4
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such is an arbritrary, unrestricted power vested in
the hands of the three Commissioners.
The Utah Court has c-onsidered Se·ction 54-6-20
in the case of Fuller Toponce Trucking Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 99 Utah 28 ; 96 Pac. ( 2d) 722.
That was an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity wherein a petition for rehearing had
been duly filed, "but the Commission delayed more than
twenty days after completion of the rehearing before
issuing its order revoking the certificate and granting
a new one. It was held that such did not deprive the
Commission of its jurisdiction and that the Commission
still had authority under due process of la-vv to modify
the original order by which a certificate had been authorized in favor of the applicant. Obviously an entirely different situation existed there as the matter
had been heard ·on an application for a public convenience and necessity certificate, the hearing of the matter
had been ·had, a rehearing requested and granted and
the rehearing conducted and there was merely a delay
in the rendition of the decision that had been taken
under advisement by the Commission.
If Section 54-6-20, which authorizes the revocation of certificates, permits or licenses, were to be
construed as a broad grant of discretionary arbritary
power, no security of operation could be had by any
motor carrier and each would be subject to the whim
of succeeding members of the Public Service Commission. We submit that such is not the intent or pur5
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pose of the law and that due process and orderly procedure require that such power be exercised only in
the event of a substantial change in circumstances or
wilful and flagrant violation of the laws of the state
or the rules of the Commission. In other words, ''for
good cause" is inherent in a statute of this nature. To
hold otherwise would obviate all constitutional guarantees of due process.
An administrative body such as the Public Service
Commission cannot be a law unto itself in all things
and arbritarily take from a carrier its certificate, as
a public utility has a substantial invested interest in
the operations and should not without due process of
law be deprived of its valuable property right without
just and substantial cause being shown.
We call to your attention the fact that Certificate
No. 1049 had been duly issued, was identical with the
certificate of the transferror, due notice to the public
and all competing carriers had been given and no appeal had ever been taken from the Order. No abandonrnent of said rights was asserted, rather the Commission seems to criticise and revoke upon the basis of too
active service to the public and other carriers.
Let us look at the reasons set forth by the Commission for this revocation of authority:
(a) They base the Order primarily upon a historical backgr·ound (R. 14-17) wherein they review a
series of six Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
issued by the Commission in succession between 1946
and 1953 covering succeeding operators in the Provo
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

area. All had Provo City and a 15 mile radial area
duly authorized. The first was limited to service for
retail establishments. In 1950 the Commisison issued
its Certificate No. 919 to Donald Ellison & John A.
Ellison covering commodities generally within Provo
City and the 15 mile radial area. This authority was
reissued on transfers until finally Provo Transfer
became the holder under its present Certificate No.
1049. At each step the Commission had before it an
application specifying the scope of authority and each
time issued its Order and Certificate reaffirming the
commodity and area descriptions and each time due
notice was published as prescribed by the Commission's own rules. Now they say in essence that they
could not do just what they had approved in this case
and many other similar transfer of authority matters
and thus they will now just cancel everything granted
to this carrier.
(b) The Commission found that Provo Transfer had
interlined or interchanged freight with Wally's Motor
Line at Provo and such was illegal because Wally's
Motor Line had no authority to operate between Salt
Lake City and Provo, Utah. (R. 10, 11, 18 & 19). We
wish to call the attention of the court to its own decision in the case of Peterson v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 266 Pac. ( 2d) 497 which was decided
on January 29, 1954, two days prior to the Report and
Order in this case, wherein your Court held that Peterson did have authority under his Certificate 992 to
transport cormnodjties hetwPPn Salt Lake City and

7
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Provo. Apparently the Commission in anger at the
decision of your Court decided to punish someone and
took the steps of cancelling the authority of Provo
Transfer as a means of retribution.
POINT THREE
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS PREDICATED UPON
FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONTRARY TO THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH IN THE CASE OF WALLACE A. PETERSON, d/b/a
WALLY'S MOTOR LINE, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, ET AL. 266 Pac. (2d) 497.

POINT FOUR
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER DENY TO CARRIERS
AND THE PUBLIC THE RIGHT OF INTERCHANGE OF
FREIGHT AS REQUIRED BY THE S'TATUTES AND CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

The Commission found the facts to be that the
petitioner is a Utah corporation and that after issuance
of its ·certificate, its principal stock holder, :Miller negotiated with Mr. Clifford W. Bailey, Mr. Wallace A.
Peterson and Mr. Clem Tucker for sale of all of the
corporation stock and that such negotiations were completed in the office of an attorney in Provo and thereupon Mr. Clifford W. Bailey and :Mr. Clem Tucker in
cooperation with ~1r. Peterson undertook management
of the corporate affairs, assuming that they had complied with all necesary requirements. However, they
had neglected to file Oaths of Office and complete
the transfer of the stock, and just prior to the hearing
on the Order to Show Cause it was discovered that
8
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such corporate niceties had not been conformed t·o and
though de facto officers had been conducting the operations, technically they had not fully qualified to perform such official acts relative to the corporation. Prior
to the time of the Order to Show Cause the interest
which Wallace A. Peterson had attempted to acquire
in the corporation was transferred from him to his
wife, Helen Peterson, and prior to the hearing the
stock certificates were duly issued and delivered and
the Oaths of Office filed, and all corporate procedures
fully compiled with by the officers and stockholders.
The Commission reads some sinister meaning into the
fact that these parties, wholly uniniated in the procedures of corporate practice, and feeling that their
counsel in Provo had completed the transaction, nevertheless carried on the corporate affairs in the same
manner as they would have done had they actually
fHed their Oaths of Office as prescribed by law. No difference in procedure is found by the Commission by
reas·on of this failure to comply with the corporate
steps, but nevertheless such is used as a primary ground
for cancellation of the operating authority.
It is submitted that one of the principles of an
order to show cause wherein a carrier or individual
presents itself before the administrative body is that
such carrier be afforded the opportunity to show that
it has rectified any defects theretofore existing and
has compiled with the rules and regulations material
to the situation at hand. These individuals first became aware of the deficiency in the eorporate re-

9
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cords when the Order to Show Cause was served upon
them and without dispute immediately took the necessary steps to comply with the oral requests of the
Commission's representatives.
The final basis for the cancellation appears to
be that Provo Transfer accepted an interchange of
freight from Wally's Motor Line but did not have on
file with the Commission such tariffs as in the opinion
of the Commission prescribed for the interchange of
traffic. It is submitted that at all times the Provo
Transfer had on file a tariff prescribing routes and
rates for the transportation of commodities generally
thoughout Provo City and the 15 mile radial authority
covered by its certificate. Testimony was presented
without dispute that Mr. Peterson, desiring to serve
the public in the transportation of commodities from
Salt Lake City to points outside of Prov-o, Utah, but
within the scope of the Provo Transfer's authority,
had talked with representatives and commissioners relative to a "purchased transportation" arrangement by
which there could be an interchange of freight. He
was advised that the Commission had not established
any rules thereon and no written Order as prescribed
by statute was ever given to Mr. Peterson or to Provo
Transfer requiring them to cease and desist from the
inter~hange of freight through the purchased transportation medium, notwithstanding the fact that the
commisioners and their representatives had full notice
of the method of interchanging freight. A formal application was made to the Commision for establishment

10
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l~

of through routes and rates by Provo Transfer and
Peterson in August of 1953, being I & S Docket No.
97, but because the Commission claimed that Peterson
had no authority into Provo, Utah, they refused to
act upon said formal application for interchange of
freight and establishment of through routes and rates,
and held under consideration such request for establishment of through rates for interlining of freight
until after its decision in this case and then on Feb.
10, 1954 finally denied authority to publish such a tariff.
We wish to call to your attention the fact that
such a refusal to permit the establishment of through
routes and rates and the interchange of freight between these two carriers is in direct violation of the
Constitution of the State of Utah and of the Statutes
of Utah, and contrary to the established principles
applied to every other carrier in the State of Utah for
the interchange of traffic.
The primary basis of the obligation in such matters is spelled out by the Utah Constitution, Section 12,
Article XII, which reads as follows:
''All railroad and other transportation companies are declared to be common carriers, and
subject to legislative control; and such companies
shall receive and transport each other's passengers and freight, without discrimination or unnecessary delay."
This is then furthe-r supplemented by Section 543-10, U.C.A. 1953, which reads as follows:
"INTERCHANGE OF BUSINESS REQUIRED. - (1) Eevery common carrier shall
11
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afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the prompt and efficient interchange
and transfer of passengers, tonnage and cars
loaded or empty, between the lines owned, operated, controlled or leased by it and the lines
of every other common carrier, and shall make
such interchange and transfer promptly, without discrimination between shippers, passengers
or carriers as to compensation charged, service
rendered or facilities afforded. Every railroad
corporation shall receive from every other railroadcorporation at any point of connection freight
cars of proper standard and in proper condition
and shall haul the same either to destination,
if the destination be upon a line owned, operated or controlled by such railroad corporation,
or to point of transfer according to route billed,
if the destination is upon the line of some other
railroad corporation. Nothing in this section
contained shall be construed as in anywise limiting or modifying the duty of a common carrier
to establish joint rates, fares and charges for
the transportation of passengers and property
over the lines owned, operated, controlled or
leased by it and the lines of other common carriers, or as in any manner limiting or modifying
the power of the commission to require the establishinent of such joint rates, fares and charges.
(2) Every telephone corporation and telegraph corporation operating in this state shall
receive, transmit and deliver, without discrimination or delay, the conversations and messages
of every other telephone or telegraph corporation with whose line a physical connection may
have been made."
General citations as to the recognized responsibility of carriers to interchange freight may be found

12
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at 13 C.J.S. 52 and at 13 C.J.S. 917. The general content of these citations is that a earrier may be lawfully
required to provide reasonable facilities to other carriers including the facilities for interchange of traffic
and transportation under its line of freight from a
connecting line.
The Commission therefore has condemned the action of these two carriers in attempting to provide service as requested by the public through interchange
of freight and has used their efforts to conform with
the statutory and constitutional requirements as an
excuse for cancelling these operating rights not withstanding the fact that the Commission itself stubbornly
refused to hear or act upon the formal application in
August of 1953 for tariffs providing for the through
routes and rates. It is significant that in the present
case the Commission in its Findings has utterly ignored the evidences of good faith of the carriers in
not only applying for the tariff as prescribed by law,
but also in discussing this matter of interchange of
freight with the Commissioners and with the Commission representatives in an effort to operate legally and
provide for the public the service demanded of them.
POINT FIVE
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

POINT SIX
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.

The exercise of powers by a regulatory body such
13
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as the Public Service Commission of Utah must be
within certain limits and cannot be of an arbritrary
and capricious character. The record in this case shows
that the officers of the Provo Transfer & Storage Co.
at the time of the hearing were Clifford W. Bailey,
President, Clarence E. Tucker, Vice-President and Helen
Peterson (wife of Wallace A. Peterson) Secretary-Treasurer. It has been shown above that the Commission,
notwithstanding the decision of this court in Peterson
v. Public Service Com1nission, whic}: was fully known
to it, nevertheless still found that ;JStrV~rRiliQr did
not have authority to serve between Salt Lake City
and Provo, and stubbornly reaffirmed that position
after the Petition for Rehearing before this Court
had been denied, and thus it appears that the Commission has taken an arbitrary and defiant attitude
in this matter. This is further reaffirmed by the fact
that said Commission in its Report and Order found
that Clifford W. Bailey and Mr. Peterson presumed
to act on behalf of the corporation and did so illegally
by having failed to file their Oaths of Office and complete the corporate procedures. ''These operations where
wholly illegal and irregular in that neither Bailey nor
Peterson were legal officers, stockholders or agents
of the corporation; ..... " (R. 18) However, immediately following the issuance of the Order in this present
case the Commission granted, and still maintains in
force, temporary authority to the Provo Transfer Co.,
a new corporation organized by Mr. Clifford W. Bailey,
of which he is also the President, to conduct within
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Provo City and a 15 mile radius a household goods
operation.
You will recall that the records showed that notwithstanding the broad scope of the authority of Provo
Transfer & Storage, petitioner herein, the operations
were divided into two divisions, namely, the household
goods division and the general commodities division,
and Mr. Bailey had the exclusive control over the
household goods division and :Mr. Tucker and Peterson had control over the general commodities, being
principally the freight which was interehanged between
\V ally's :Motor Line and petitioner. There is no dispute but that a very substantial volume of traffic
was handled in both of these departments of petitioner.
We challenge the sincerity and fairness of the
Co:rnmission in finding on February 1, 1954 that Mr.
C. vV. Bailey is guilty of illegal and irregular conduct
of busines and within two weeks granting to his wholly
owned corporation, bearing substantially the same name
as petitioner, authority to carry on the very business
which they found to he apparently unnecessary, illegal
and irregular.
The Commisison at no place finds that there is
not a need for the service that was being peformed by
petitioner and does not dispute the fact that substantial volumes of freight were being transported for the
public continuously from August of 1953 and that during all of said period there was pending before the
Commission not only the formal application for establiRhment of through routes and rates, but also the
15
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informal request for approval of the lease or purchased
transportation arrangements so that the public could
be served while the Commission could make up its
mind on the tariff matter.
No specification of violations were made 1n the
order diTecting the petitioner to appear before the
Commission and show cause, and hence no opportunity
was presented for knowing what the Commission would
rely upon in the cancellation of this valid opera;ting
authority. We submit that the principles of constitutional law, both of the State of Utah and the United
States, have been violated in this arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission and desire to refer the
Court to a recent decision of the U. S. Supreme Court
wherein the quotation of suspension of a physician's
license was considered. Therein the Court found in a
divided 6-3 decision that due process had been followed
in that particular case, but the following citation is
a reiteration of the rule as applicable to our situation:
Barsky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 98 L. Ed
545 at 559:
''This latter ground, if the basis of the
Regent's action, would indicate that in New York
a doctor's right to practice rests on no more
than the will of the Regents. This Court, however, said many years ago that "the nature and
theory of our institutions of government . . . .
do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power ....
For, the very idea that one man may be com-

16
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pelled to hold his life, or the means of living,
or any material right essential to the enjoyment
of life, at the mere will of another, seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails
. . . . . '' Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369,
370, 30 L ed 220, 226, 6 S Ct 1064. ''
No standards have been established by the Legislature of the State of Uta:h as a guide to the Public
Service Commission in the revocation or suspension
of operating authority. The affirmative guide for the
granting of authority to a common carrier is the existence of public convenience and necessity, which requires the performance of the particular service in the
area involved. The converse of that would seem to
be that the Commission should find that no public convenience and necessity exists for the operation which
has been cancelled and annulled. However, even that
has not been spelled out or defined by the Legislature.
Therefore, under the guise of ''good cause'' the Commission may arbitrarily and for any peculiar reason
deemed good cause by it, "suspend, alter, amend or
revoke any certificate.'' Perhaps the Commission in
this present case by an Order which purports to "cancel and annul" has conformed with such statute, bnt
we doubt that constitutionally it has any grounds for
this action.
It is significant that the Legislature has set up
a different penalty for the type of conduct which the
Commission purports to find in its Findings of Fact
in that Section 54-6-18 U.C.A., 1953, provides that a
17
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carrier who violates the proVIsions of this act or who
fails to obey any lawful order, decision, or regulation
of the commision shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Surely the Legislature did not intend that
action such as is shown by the record in this case and
outlined in the Findings should be a basis for cancellation of a carrier's authority, particularly where the
absolute evidence of good faith is shown in the attempts
of the carrier to publish tariffs, inquire of the Commission for guidance and procure the decision of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as to the scope
of connecting carriers authority. Should all of the
things found to be facts by the Commission be true,
nevertheless the most that should be imposed on this
carrier should be the charge of a misdemeanor and not
the radical cancellation and annullment of its certificate.

vV e quote this significant language from the Pet<~rson v. Public Service Cmnmission case, supra 2GG
P. (2d) 497:
"It is the prerogative of this Court to determine whether the Commission regularly pursued its authority. Under Sec. 54-6-4, U.C.A.
1953 vesting in the Commission power to regulate motor carriers we do not find any authority either directly, or reasonably incident thereto, by which the Commission could arbitrarily
refuse to approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the
rights a carrier possesses under a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity."
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CONCLUSION
This petitioner respectfully submits that the Supreme Court should reverse the Order of the Public
Service Commission and direct that the operating rights
and authority be restored to the Provo Transfer & Storage Co.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
721 Cont 'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Petitioner
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